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A
participative integral philosophy, as I view it, is
broad-based, drawing from multiple disci-
plines. It is inclusive yet discriminating in valu-
ing and ranking different perspectives. That valuing is
not achieved through texts or algorithms but by each
individual.
One of the first to articulate such a philosophy
from a psychological perspective was Roberto
Assagioli, founder of the humanistic-transpersonal
psychology, psychosynthesis (Assagioli, 1965, 1973).
He envisioned psychosynthesis as a positive and partic-
ipative psychology for the “whole person,” that is,
encompassing physical, emotional, mental, existential,
social, and spiritual domains. Assagioli argued that
each individual, based on his or her perspective, needs
to choose authentically how growth and development
will be completed. 
In the east, Sri Aurobindo, an Indian educated in
Britain in the late 19th century, returned to India,
became a political radical trying to oust British rule
from India, and was jailed as a terrorist for a year,
awaiting his trial (Iyengar, 1985). While in the Alipore
jail, he had a number of transcendental experiences,
and they served as a catalyst for him to synthesize
purna (Integral) yoga. Aurobindo developed purna yoga
based on his interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita, as
well as other Vedanta texts. Its fundamental goal was
to integrate both mundane and spiritual aspects of life
(Aurobindo, 1970, 1997; Sharma, 2000). Prior to this
time, yoga traditionally had been separated into vari-
ous subpractices, including physical development
(hatha yoga), emotional development (bhakti yoga),
mental development (jnana yoga), and behavior devel-
opment (karma yoga) (Narvane, 1964; Puligandlar,
1975). Purna yoga blended these yogic subdisciplines
into a unified and balanced system that also included
a two-directional life flow—an ascent toward the
supermind and a descent of supermind into one’s lived
life (Aurobindo, 1999).
Previously, yoga systems had focused on transcend-
ing mundane life to merge with the Divine, for exam-
ple, Sankara’s Advaita Vandanta (Satchid nandendra,
1997). Interestingly, this two-directional flow is also
found in the expressed thoughts of Plato (Lovejoy,
1964) and Plotinus (1992). Aurobindo’s integral phi-
losophy was ably presented in the United States by
Haridas Chaudhuri. Chaudhuri and his wife estab-
lished the Cultural Integration Fellowship, from which
emerged an educational branch, later to become the
present California Institute of Integral Studies
(Chaudhuri, personal communication, 1992).
Chaudhuri presented the major concepts of
Aurobindo’s work through several books, including
Integral Yoga (1965).
Robert Gerard, a one-time associate of Roberto
Assagioli, developed an “Integral Psychology” that was
a blend of psychosynthesis, depth psychology, human-
istic-existential psychology, transpersonal psychology,
and western esoteric traditions (Gerard, 1974; person-
al communication, 2004).
Ken Wilber has, since 1977, been a leader in
transpersonal thought, but has officially abandoned it
in favor of his version of integral thought (Wilber,
2000a, 2002a). In 1995, Wilber’s book, Sex, Ecology,
Spirituality (SES) presented an expansive and inclusive
philosophic view that included a quadrant perspective
encompassing Plato’s three life dimensions: the good
(intersubjective dimension of shared meaning, values,
and beliefs), the true (empirical dimension of observ-
able truth), and the beautiful (personal subjective
dimension of values, beliefs, meaning, and goals).
Wilber soon expanded the concepts presented in SES
through a series of other books, including A Brief
History of Everything (1996), The Eye of Spirit (1997),
The Marriage of Sense and Soul (1998), Integral
Psychology (1999), A Theory of Everything (2000b), and
Boomeritis (2002b).
Integral Philosophy
So far, we have discussed spiritual and psychologi-
cal aspects of integral philosophy; now let us look at
philosophy.
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Philosophy has been defined as the pursuit of wis-
dom, but this seems no longer true, at least for main-
stream academic philosophers, because they must
demonstrate proof of their philosophical progress
through publications, if they are to survive in acade-
mia. It is far easier to accomplish this with small steps,
rather than addressing head-on the ineffable “what is.”
As James Ogilvy stated (1992, p. xv), “Philosophy as
the love of wisdom is as ridiculous in the academy as
romantic love in a bordello.” Nevertheless, from an
integral perspective, a theoretical philosophical goal is
to integrate the Good, the True, and the Beautiful into
a seamless whole. And, although the Platonic terms
good, true, and beautiful are rarely used in contempo-
rary discourse, the concepts are (Smith, 1997). For
example, the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory char-
acterizes these terms as technical understanding (the
true); practical understanding (the good), also termed
mutual understanding; and emancipatory understand-
ing (the beautiful) (Habermas, 2003; McCarthy,
1978; Wilber, 1995). By the way, the good, the true,
and the beautiful, in this paper, correlate to three
world domains: intersubjectivity, objectivity, and sub-
jectivity.
Wisdom is also an important characteristic of par-
ticipatory integral philosophy, particularly in terms of
its praxis (Ferrer, 2000). It includes the ability to man-
age secular aspects of life, in a context of knowledge
and lived experience, grounded in spiritual themes
(Holiday & Chandler, 1986). Participatory wisdom, as
applied in contemporary life, seems to require both
pragmatism and resilience in order to work through
experiences of frustration, successfully dealing with
existential issues in one’s life. This includes dealing
with problems that arise and learning to revise one’s
own cherished concepts in light of new discoveries
(Daniels & Horowitz, 1984; Habermas, 2003;
Paulson, 2001). From a humanistic perspective,
humans want to make sense of their lives and to know
and feel that their pursuits are both significant and
worthwhile (Washburn, 2003). Yet, participatory wis-
dom is not the pursuit of happiness, per se. It is,
instead, a “knowing” of what produces happiness and
what produces results, combined with the ability and
desire to act in relation to that knowledge (Holiday &
Chandler, 1986). The action component is often dis-
missed, as if the acquisition of knowledge were “good
enough.” Action, or application, is fundamental to the
practice of participatory integralism (Paulson, 2002).
Philosophies have developed, more or less, as
closed theoretical systems, exemplified in the works of
great luminaries down through the ages. These lumi-
naries and their work include Confucius; the Vedic
Scholars; the logic of the Sophists and Protagoras;
Socrates and the dialectic process; Plato and justice,
the state, and virtue; Aristotle and material, formal,
efficient, and final causes; Buddha and the four noble
truths; the hedonistic visions of Epicurus; the stoic
visions of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius; the religious
scholarship of Aquinas; Descartes and rationalism; the
skepticism of Hume, Locke, and Berkeley; the univer-
salism of Kant; the pragmatism of Williams James; the
class struggle and materialism of Marx; the nihilism
and will to power of Nietzsche; the existential perspec-
tives of Kierkegaard and Sartre; and the relativistic
themes of many postmodern advocates, such as
Foucault, Deleuze, Barthes, and Lyotard (Beck &
Holmes, 1968; Best & Kellner, 1991). These various
philosophies contain interesting and important theo-
retical propositions, but for individual application,
many of the concepts are too abstract.
From the end of the Greek state to the present,
humans have tended to value one worldview domain
over the other two (Tarnas, 1991; Toynbee, 1995;
Wilber, 1998, 2002b). In fact, these domains were no
longer distinct in theory or praxis until around the six-
teenth century. Western civilization, it seems, tacitly
viewed intersubjectivity, the domain of religion, as the
“real” and ignored the other two domains. Religion
provided the purpose and meaning to life, codes for
ethical living, a justice system, and an intellectually
satisfying hierarchical map of the world, seen and
unseen, beginning with matter, then plants, animals,
humans, the clergy, the angelic hierarchy, and, finally,
God. This structure was known as the “great chain of
being” (Lovejoy, 1964). Subjectivity and objectivity,
for the most part, seem to have been but appendages
of religious intersubjectivity. This is a rather general
statement, for there certainly was more to the intersub-
jectivity perspective than merely church doctrine: for
example, state doctrine, which was also grounded in
intersubjectivity. Individual meaning and beliefs seem
to be injunctions of church doctrine (Frend, 1984;
Tillich, 1968). When people expressed this individual
view too forcefully, they were viewed with suspicion
and scorn, and sometimes even roasted at the stake.
Objective reality was also explained in terms of religious
doctrine, which described creation (Lindberg, 1992).
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Yet by the sixteenth century, a few radicals began to
question church doctrine, not with another doctrine,
but by actually observing physical phenomena
(Gower, 1997). To the chagrin of both they and the
Church, their observations of the world and the
church doctrine describing it did not generally agree.
Something had to give, and it ultimately was religion.
Science began its ascent as the torch-bearer of reality,
grounded in observation and measurement. Over
time, religion gave way to science as “reality.” The
importance of personal independent subjectivity also
emerged, particularly in pursuits such as phenomenol-
ogy and psychology (Smith, 1997).
Yet, even today, proponent disciplines within each
life domain have generally ignored proponent disci-
plines grounded in the others, or attacked them
through polemic discourse (Davidson, 2001;
McCarthy, 1978). The latter has occurred vehemently
in academia, as departments grounded in each of the
three worldviews argue to justify their existence, that
is, funding. Objective empirical science, however, is
currently the main academic reality. Science, as a way
of acquiring objective knowledge, is extremely power-
ful, and contemporary societies rest on its technical
applications. From computers to cell phones, from jet
travel to backpacking with global positioning systems,
to landing probes on Mars, science has impacted and
changed our lives more than any of the other two
domains. 
Humanistic-existential, depth, and transpersonal
psychologists often privilege subjectivity as the most
“real” domain, contending that subjective values and
meaning cannot be ignored without peril (Vaillant,
1993). In fact, they point out that the majority of peo-
ple they counsel have become dysfunctional,
depressed, anxious, unhappy, and unfulfilled because
of the lack of feeling genuine self-acceptance, a subjec-
tive concern (Bugental, 1981; Paulson, 2004;
Schneider & May, 1995). Additionally, some argue
that phenomena do not exist if there is not someone to
perceive and experience them. For example, Yalom
(1980), some years ago, realized, while snorkeling in
the ocean, that its beautiful life forms were beautiful
only because he viewed them so. Similarly, Nietzsche
(1995) described Zarathustra’s reentry into the world
from a ten-year retreat as stopping before the sun and
saying: “You great star, what would your happiness be
had you not those for whom you shine?” (p. 9).
Some postmodern philosophers—deconstruction-
alists, in particular—view intersubjectivity as the most
“real.” But they also claim that there is no solid reality,
because everything is relative. For them, meaning
exists in the universe only via constructed language, a
shared system of linguistic codes and signs (Best &
Kellner, 1991; Culler, 1982). Humans use language to
construe meaning, not the reverse. The “linguistic
turn” has convinced most that, to a very large degree,
it is language, not observation or subjective awareness,
that constructs one’s perceived reality. Inner reality is
mediated by shared linguistic codes (Best & Kellner,
1991; Katz, 1978). Yet, the objective world, in a fun-
damental sense, is pregiven and not dependent on
one’s inner reality. Humans did not construct the
objective world, but, instead, find themselves here in
it. No matter how linguistically one construes being
shot in the head, the result is the same: the end. It is
humans who construct intersubjective, social
reality–status, monetary exchange, social rules of con-
duct, and cultural beliefs. Let us now turn our atten-
tion to practical life concerns. 
Contemporary Life
Our contemporary life is claimed to overload
humans with information, choice, responsibility, and
contingency. For many, just to pay their bills and taxes
requires holding multiple jobs. Governmental agencies
impose ever more control over citizens through sur-
veillance and laws. Contemporary life requires work-
force members to witness the vaporization by the
thousands of traditional full-time, full-benefit jobs,
perhaps even their own, to make way for part-time,
no-benefit jobs. Contemporary life is permeated by an
ominous, yet elusive, threat of yet another deadly ter-
rorist attack. It requires citizens to accept the tram-
pling of ecological systems and their stewardship
under the guise of “progress.” But what is this
progress? It is unrestrained urban sprawl? Is it dump-
ing industrial waste without regard for future conse-
quences? 
We find that the world presented to us by our par-
ents, teachers, and religions does not exist, and many
cannot find a substitute with merit. So, like the mass-
es described in Dosteovsky’s (1949) The Brothers
Karamazov, all too often, we rely on the voice of
authority to shoulder the problems. Instead of accept-
ing freedom, choice, and the responsibility, too many
allow today’s “Grand Inquisitors”—political, scientific,
and religious leaders, to tell them what to believe, what
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is true, what to do, who is good, who is bad or “evil,”
what their duties are, and even who they are. Yet too
many continue to be unhappy, unfulfilled, self-depre-
ciated, and empty.
There is no escape from our increasing responsibil-
ities and the risks accompanying them, but to cope, we
often need to compartmentalize many areas of our
lives. We construct professional roles to isolate us from
subordinates. We ignore the homeless, even shun them
as being lazy, while knowing, deep in our hearts, that
we, too, tragically could be there. We tend to view the
truth from a partial perspective and claim it is “The
Truth.” But too often, we cannot even find partial
truth, only a story. At some point, we tire of the sto-
ries and justifications provided by others. It is then
that one must decide to see for oneself “what is.” But
where does one begin? Integral philosophy states it is
within oneself, where one is situated (Assagioli, 1965;
Ferrer, 2000). 
With this said, let us return to Wilber’s theoretical
perspective, because his model has much to offer to a
participatory integral philosophy. Wilber, as does
Arthur Koestler (1964), views phenomena as at once
both whole and part; that is, a “holon.” An electron,
for example, is a whole electron but part of an atom;
an atom is a whole atom but part of a molecule; a mol-
ecule is a whole molecule but part of an organelle; an
organelle is a whole organelle but part of an organ
(Wilber, 1995). Additionally, humans experience both
a subjective (interior) and objective (exterior) perspec-
tive of existence. Humans live as individuals, as well as
in collectives of humans (Wilber, 1999). Moreover, the
collective consists of an interior intersubjective and an
exterior interobjective domain generally referred to as
culture and society. Putting these concepts together, a
four-domain reality emerges, which can be mapped as
a square divided into four equal quadrants.
The part represents an individual human being and
the collective, a society. The subjective characterizes
both the interior of an individual and that of the col-
lective (intersubjective), while the objective character-
izes the exterior domain of both an individual and the
collective (interobjective). However, the concept of
collective is a relative one, for it can consist of several
humans, a small social group, an age group, a commu-
nity, or even all of humanity.
Wilber’s upper left quadrant (the individual subjec-
tive domain) represents the first-person (“I”) interior
perspective, experienced through one’s conscious
awareness, sense of self, emotions, goals, meaning,
aspirations, values, and memory (Wilber, 1995).
Wilber’s upper right quadrant (the individual objective
domain) is a third-person, singular view, described in
“it” terms. It includes one’s physical body, organ sys-
tems, cells, and brain structures, and one’s overt behav-
ior. The lower left quadrant (the intersubjective collec-
tive domain) is expressed in second-personal, plural,
“we” terms, representing shared values, goals, mean-
ing, worldviews, beliefs, aspirations, and language.
The lower right quadrant (the interobjective collective
domain) is described in third-person plural terms and
represents “things,” such as geophysical structures
(mountains), geopolitical structures (India), laws,
social structures, social behaviors, and social systems.
Each of these quadrants interacts with the others.
So “reality” must take into account all four domains.
No quadrant domain can be reduced and explained
solely in terms of another quadrant domain. For exam-
ple, our subjective feelings have physical biochemical
correlates but cannot be completely explained by bio-
chemistry.
Wilber’s quadrant model is theoretically satisfying,
but so what? By itself, is it not merely one more way of
constructing a worldview, albeit a larger one? What
positive applied or participative value does it provide?
Wilber asserts his theories are applicable and that they
have been applied (Wilber, 2000b). This is certainly
true. This author has applied his theoretical models to
business, clinical trials of antimicrobial products used
in surgical environments, biostatistical research
designs, marketing strategies, and near death studies
(Paulson, 1996, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003a,
2003b). Yet there is a problem in that Wilber’s model
lacks emphasis to empower an individual to authenti-
cally coparticipate in life. 
Wilber’s integral philosophy, in its theoretical
form, is a ready-made system, not one codeveloped by
the individual participating in life through lived expe-
riences. It thus falls short of a participatory integral
philosophy. To be a participatory philosophy and,
hence, of more personally authentic value, it needs to
empower individuals to find their own authentic ways
of knowing, learning, and dealing with life, and to
value them (Ferrer, 2003a,b; Paulson, 2001).
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Conclusion
A participatory philosophy of integralism is one
that is to be authentically applied mindfully in one’s
life process. There is the ever-present need to learn
from other views, from other individuals, and from
history (Tarnas, 1991). This learning can lead not just
to the accumulation of knowledge or of construed sys-
tems but also to acquired practical wisdom. A partici-
patory integral philosophy, then, is a living philoso-
phy, one that never becomes a finished product. It is a
multi-perspective philosophy, providing an enlarged
view of “what is,” but a “what is” from the inner refer-
ence of a human agent, not from highjacking textual
doctrine (Ferrer, 2003a,b; Murphy, 1992; Paulson,
2001). There is no one, in the end, who can own
responsibility for one’s life except oneself, the individ-
ual. This paper is not a final answer but a plea for oth-
ers to join into dialogue in search of developing a par-
ticipatory integral philosophy.
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